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Recent empirical ﬁndings on ﬁrms’ expenditure towards the creation and acqui-
sition of knowledge goods, otherwise known as intangibles, suggest that their share
in overall investment has grown considerably. Still, intangible investment is rarely
present in investment models. In this paper, I extend the q-theory of investment to
model explicitly the decision of ﬁrms to invest in intangibles. I then use the model to
measure the contribution of intangible goods to the overall capital stock in the U.S.
The model highlights the embodiment of intangible goods in tangibles and the role
of relative price movements in the measurement of the contribution of each type of
investment to the overall capital stock. In particular, given that the relative cost of
the main input to intangible production, skilled labor, rose substantially in the 80s
and 90s, the price of intangibles inherits this rise. As a result, the downward trend
in the aggregate investment deﬂator series reported by national accounts, which ac-
counts only for the presence of tangible investment goods, is found to have a signiﬁcant
downward bias in the 90s. The model also shows that the growth in the overall capital
stock from the late-80s until 2000 was driven mainly by an increase in the contri-
bution of intangibles. However, the contribution of intangibles fell consistently after
2000. These results underscore the importance of accounting for the movements in the
price of intangibles rather than focusing only on their rising share in overall investment.
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Recent empirical ﬁndings point to a considerable increase in the share of intangible expendi-
tures in overall investment since the early 80s. Still, intangible investment is rarely accounted
for in investment models. This paper extends the q-theory of investment to account for both
the existence of intangible investment goods and the movement of their price over time. The
model highlights the embodiment of intangible goods in tangibles and the role of relative
price movements in the measurement of the contribution of each type of investment good to
the overall capital stock. The model is used to: 1) derive the quantitative implications on
the behavior of the capital stock and 2) to measure the contribution of embodied intangible
investment goods to the overall capital stock in the U.S.
The increasing share of intangibles since 1950 is documented in a comprehensive study
by Corrado et al. (2006). The authors construct a data set on U.S. ﬁrms’ spending on
an identiﬁed list of intangible inputs1. This list consists of three main categories: com-
puterized information (software and database expenses), innovative property (scientiﬁc and
non-scientiﬁc R&D) and economic competencies (training expenses, advertising expenditures
and spending on organizational change and design)2. They ﬁnd that the share of intangible
investment in overall investment since 1950 has steadily increased over time and that by
2000, investment in intangible capital was as large as investment in physical capital3.
Other authors have attempted to measure the size of intangibles by taking indirect ap-
proaches. For example, Hall (2001) uses a q-theory model to infer the amount of intangible
investment such that his model matches the movements in the stock market. McGrattan
and Prescott (2007a) use a general equilibrium model to generate the intangible series which
makes movements in hours worked, in producing both intangibles and tangibles, match some
aggregate moments.
A key limitation to all these approaches is that none of them separately identify indices for
the price and quantity of intangible investment goods. Corrado et al. (2006) and Hall (2001)
1A consensus emerged overtime among national accountants on what those items should be. See Vossel-
man (1998).
2See Belhocine (2008a) for a list and a description of speciﬁc items included in each group.
3Similar work conducted for Canada, the U.K. and Japan respectively by Belhocine (2008a), Marrano
and Haskel (2006) and Fukao et al. (2007) reached similar ﬁndings.
1simply assume that the price of intangibles is the same as the price of tangible investment
goods. McGrattan and Prescott (2007a) guess a price series in order to infer an intangible
investment series.
The distinction between the price and the quantity of intangibles is an important issue
because it is not clear how much of the increase in the overall expenditure on intangibles
is attributable to the real contribution of intangibles. Moreover, Hall’s lack of distinction
between the price of tangibles and intangibles eﬀectively implies some unlikely movements
in the stock of intangibles, including that they were negative for a decade after 1974 and
extremely volatile in the last decade.
What is more, the substantial increase in the relative cost of the main input to intangibles
production, skilled labor, suggests that the relative price of intangibles also rose (Katz and
Autor (1999) and Lemieux (2007) review the literature on the rise in the skill-premium).
A closer look at the aforementioned list of intangible items reveals that they are mainly
produced by a class of skilled workers made of university graduates and executives. The real
average compensation of these two types of workers has been increasing since the early 1980s
until it peaked in 2000 and declined somewhat. This compensation pattern should translate
into a rise in the unit cost of intangibles up to the year 2000 and a subsequent fall.
In order to account for both the existence of intangible investment goods and the move-
ment of their price over time, I develop and implement a generalized q-theory of investment.
Previous authors have mainly assumed that intangible goods are disembodied and that the
stock of intangibles can be conceptualized as separately evolving from the physical capital
stock of ﬁrms. However, many intangible investments made by ﬁrms appear to be “em-
bodied” in a composite stock made of tangible and intangible capital. One might think
of this composite stock as combinations of “hardware” (e.g. oﬃce buildings, computers,
machines) and “software” (organizational design, operating systems, blueprints) which have
been brought together by past investments.
This is precisely how the investment process is modeled, with units of intangible and tan-
gible goods being optimally combined as intermediates in the production of a ﬁnal aggregate
investment good. It is this ﬁnal investment good that is accumulated overtime and used in
output production. Changes in the share of expenditures on the two types of investment
2goods over time reﬂect exogenous technological change in the ﬁnal investment good sector.
The price of intangible goods reﬂects the costs of producing them which, in turn, reﬂects
the wages of skilled labor. I construct a price series for intangibles based upon the compen-
sation received by university graduates and executives and estimates of their share in the
production of intangibles (similar to those used by Corrado et al. (2006)).
Both the rise in the price of intangibles and their increasing share in overall invest-
ment results in an aggregate investment deﬂator whose behavior contrasts markedly with
the (physical) investment deﬂator reported by national income accounts; while the invest-
ment deﬂator of national accounts exhibits a downward trend starting in the mid-1950s,
the investment deﬂator constructed from the model to include intangible investment has a
downward trend up to the mid-1980s and then rises up to 2000 and declines afterwards4.
In other words, the behavior of the acquisition cost of capital is dramatically diﬀerent when
intangibles are accounted for.
The model successfully generates a smoothly-behaving series of capital stock with a
market value that predominantly remains above and close to its acquisition cost; this reﬂects
a Tobin’s q that ﬂuctuates closely around its equilibrium value, a desirable feature which is
not observed in empirical measures of Tobin’s q when capital exclusively consists of tangible
investment. This result is a direct implication of: 1) the new trend observed in the acquisition
cost of capital once intangibles are accounted for and 2) the increased size of capital stock once
intangible investment goods are accounted for. These successful quantitative implications
suggest that the mixed econometric success of the q-theory might be a consequence of the
omission of intangible investment5.
Finally, the model is used to measure the extent to which the composition of the stock of
capital in the economy has shifted over time towards the inclusion of more intangible capital
at the expense of tangible capital. The decomposition of capital stock into its investment
constituents shows that the rise in overall capital stock from the mid-80s until the late 90s
was mainly driven by an increase in intangible investment despite an increase in tangible
4The secular fall in the price of physical investment goods is a well documented fact. See in particular
Greenwood et al. (1997) and Krusell (1998).
5These potential speciﬁcation problems are mentioned in a related discussion by Hall (2004) pp. 914-915.
See the conclusion section for an elaboration on this point.
3investment. In particular, I ﬁnd that once the price movements of the two investment goods
are accounted for, the relative contribution of accumulated intangible investments to overall
capital stock was higher prior the 1990s and substantially lower during the 1990s than other
authors have found.
Taken together, the ﬁndings in this paper underscore the importance of intangible in-
vestment as a source of value for the ﬁrm and as a key component of any investment theory.
Moreover, this paper provides a consistent account of the compositional changes that have
occurred in the last 25 years in the U.S. economy by bringing together the evidence on the
rise of the skill premium, the evidence on the increasing importance of intangible investment
and the evidence on the behavior of aggregate securities.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the approach followed is contrasted with other
approaches that try to account for the presence of intangibles. The most notable feature that
distinguishes this work are: 1) the linkage of the unit cost of intangibles to the wage behavior
of skilled workers and 2) the embodiment of intangibles in tangible investment goods. Section
3 outlines how the extension of the q-theory is constructed. It will also describe the approach
used to disentangle the contribution of each type of investment good to the capital stock.
Section 4 discusses how the parameters are calibrated and what data sources are used to
document some of these choices. This section also details the technology by which skilled
workers, identiﬁed as university graduates and executives, produce intangibles. Section 5
describes the ﬁndings with regards to the inferred capital stock, the behavior of Tobins’
q and the changing composition of the capital stock over time. Section 6 compares the
ﬁndings with the work and results of the two closest approaches in the literature, namely
Hall (2001) and McGrattan and Prescott (2007a). Section 7 outlines the sensitivity analysis
conducted to assess the robustness of the results. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of
future research.
2 Diﬀerence with Other Approaches
The baseline neoclassical model of investment, also known as the q-theory of investment,
predicts that the decision of a ﬁrm to invest is a function of a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁt




























































































































































































































































Figure 1: Net Value of Securities and Value of Capital Stock (in billions). Source: Hall
(2001), NIPA and author’s calculations
Hayashi (1982) showed the conditions under which the marginal beneﬁt of increasing capital
is identiﬁed with the net value of outstanding securities. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of the aggregate value of net securities together with the acquisition cost of capital or its
replacement cost. The q-theory states that, from this graph, the ﬁrm can deduce the beneﬁts
and costs it faces in its decision to adjust capital by one unit: if the capital in place has a
higher value than the capital that is not yet installed then the ﬁrm should take advantage
of the arbitrage opportunity. Any discrepancy between the cost and beneﬁt is due to capital
adjustment costs which slow down the arbitrage process.
Another way of presenting this tradeoﬀ is through Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of the
net value of securities to the acquisition cost of capital. Tobin’s q reﬂects the incentive of
the ﬁrm to adjust its capital stock: the ﬁrm should invest if the value is bigger than one,
otherwise the ﬁrm should disinvest. Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of Tobin’s q.
Two aspects of this behavior are diﬃcult to rationalize from the perspective of the q-







































































































































Figure 2: Behavior of Tobin’s q. Source: Hall (2001), NIPA and author’s calculations
capital by one unit suggesting a very long adjustment period. In fact, the econometric
implementation of the q-theory by Summers (1981) implied an adjustment period of 8 years6.
This number is viewed as unrealistic. Second, the period from the mid-1970s until the mid-
1980s features an aggregate value of ﬁrms below the acquisition cost of capital. This is viewed
as a puzzle because the ﬁrm’s capital can be sold at a higher value than when kept inside
the ﬁrm (see Baily, 1981). In other words, there are arbitrage opportunities that agents are
not taking advantage of.
Four broad research directions have been pursued to explain these anomalies in Tobin’s
q. The ﬁrst line of attack was to study how ﬁnancial markets do not accurately reﬂect
the fundamental value of the ﬁrm. This literature developed diﬀerent models but none
of them seem to be immune from problems despite the strong theoretical and empirical
evidence for the existence of bubbles (see LeRoy (2004) for a review of this literature).
The second line of attack was to relax the restrictive assumptions that allowed the value
of the installed capital to reﬂect the marginal value of increasing the capital stock; the
6Other studies conﬁrmed the long implied adjustment period. See Chirinko (1993) for a review of the
literature. However, more recent work which uses natural experiments, exempliﬁed by the paper of Cummins
et al. (1994) and (1996) have found shorter adjustment periods.
6reliance on perfect competition, constant returns to scale and quadratic adjustment costs
might not be accurate. This literature had some success in improving on the q-theory but
the improvements are sometimes viewed as marginal (see Caballero (1999) for a review of
this literature). A third approach was to question the use of a representative ﬁrm at the
aggregate level and to focus instead on modeling the heterogeneity observed at the plant
level. This literature abandoned the macroeconomic approach to modeling investment (see
the review of this literature in Bond and Van Reenen (2007)). Finally, one explanation that
has received attention in the past few years is the existence of another category of investment
that has not yet been accounted for in theoretical and empirical investigations. This category
of investment goods consists of intangible goods. The argument is that if the net value of
securities reﬂects, under rational valuation, the value of installed capital stock, then periods
of marked departure of the net value of securities from the acquisition cost of tangible capital
stock is evidence for the accumulation of intangible capital by ﬁrms.
This last possibility was proposed by Hall (2001). His paper uses the q-theory of in-
vestment to generate the stock of capital in the economy. From this inferred capital, the
component which is recorded in national income accounts as physical capital is subtracted
and the residual is assimilated to intangible capital. One crucial assumption in Hall’s work
is the assumption that the intangible and tangible investment goods are perfect substitutes
and that their price is equal. These two assumptions are violated, under the framework of
this paper, as discussed in the introduction: the share of intangibles in the overall capital
expenditures has been increasing overtime and the unit cost of intangibles behaves the op-
posite of the price of physical capital. Finally, one anomaly in Hall’s ﬁndings is that the
quantity of intangibles falls below zero for a decade, starting in the mid-70s.
Eliades and Weeken (2004) apply Hall’s methodology to the U.K. These authors also
ﬁnd negative intangibles throughout the 70s, the 80s and early 90s. However, they reach
the same qualitative results as Hall (2001) for the late 90s. Belhocine (2008b) applies this
approach to Canada for the period after 1990 and reaches the same qualitative conclusions
as those found for the U.S. and the U.K.
I depart from Hall’s approach by: 1) relaxing the assumption of equality between the
price of intangibles and tangibles and 2) allowing some degree of substitutability between
7the two investment goods.
McGrattan and Prescott (2005a) make another attempt to use the unmeasured levels
of intangible capital to rationalize the rise in the U.S. and U.K. stock markets in late 90s.
The authors depart from Hall’s work by taking a general equilibrium approach with no
frictions aside from the existence of taxes. The authors rationalize the size of intangible
investment found in Corrado et al. (2005) in the 1990s while using the change in tax
regulations to account for the diﬀering performance between the U.K. and the U.S. stock
markets. McGrattan and Prescott (2005b) show that by explicitly accounting for intangible
investment in an otherwise standard real business cycle model, one can explain the low
productivity levels in the early 90s. In particular, they argue that GDP in national income
accounts is undervalued because intangible investment is expensed, which ultimately created
a downward bias in the productivity estimates for the early 90s. Taking this work further,
McGrattan and Prescott (2007a) extend the baseline real business cycle model to allow
for the production of intangibles by the representative agent. The goal of their work is to
reconcile the real business cycle model’s prediction of a fall in hours worked after the 1990s
with actual evidence of their increase. In particular, their model is calibrated to match some
aggregate macroeconomic series and features two stocks of capital: a tangible capital stock
and an intangible capital stock.
In this paper, I calibrate the extended q-theory model to the aggregate value of securities
and the extended model features only one capital stock index that embodies both tangi-
ble and intangible investment goods. Another diﬀerence with the work of McGrattan and
Prescott is the way the price of intangibles is calculated: McGrattan and Prescott (2007b)
state that they guessed the price of intangibles in their solution to derive a series of intangible
investment. As mentioned above, I derived the price of intangibles from the behavior of the
cost of its main inputs.
Finally, the proposed model is most comparable to the work of Hall (2000). In Hall’s
paper, he focuses on the period from 1990 to 2000 and tries to link the behavior of university
graduate wages with the formation of intangible capital. Hall does not however account
for the changing structure of ﬁrms’ investment as done in the extended model I propose.
In addition, Hall assumes that the intangible and tangible capital stocks evolve over time
8separately while I develop a model with a homogeneous capital stock. Moreover, the inclusion
of executives in the class of skilled labor are another conceptual and empirical diﬀerence
between Hall’s work and the model developed below. Finally, the long-term approach I
adopt illuminates the pre-1990 events as well as the post-1990 events.
Although most studies ﬁnd that the size of intangible capital is substantial, Hall (2003)
and Bond and Cummins (2000) are exceptions. They both show, using diﬀerent data, that
the returns to physical capital exhaust all payments to capital and hence, nothing is left over
to reward the services of intangible capital. This is held as evidence for the absence of a
substantial intangible capital stock which is puzzling in light of the ﬁndings in the previously
cited papers. In the conclusion section, I discuss how to reconcile the ﬁndings of Hall (2003)
and Bond and Cummins (2000) with the results obtained here.
3 Including Intangibles in the Q-theory of Investment
The standard neoclassical model of investment as developed in Hayashi (1982) is extended
to account for the production of intangibles. Once produced, intangible investment goods
are combined with tangible investment goods, which are bought from the market, to produce
a ﬁnal investment good that accumulates into a capital stock which is used in production.
Ultimately, the model relates the value of securities to the value of the capital in place within
ﬁrms. This key relationship allows the generation of a series for the capital stock and the
construction of a series for Tobin’s q.
There is perfect competition in input and output markets. The ﬁrm employs two types
of labor, skilled and unskilled. An amount lu of unskilled labor is used for the production of
output only. It is paid wu. Skilled labor is used for two tasks: the amount ls is used for the
production of output and the remainder, hs, is used for the production of intangibles. Skilled




where θ is a productivity parameter. The existence of this function is motivated by the need
to capture the link between the rise in the wage paid to skilled labor and the increase in
the price of intangible investment goods. This function will allow the ratio of the intangible
9to tangible price to vary over time instead of being set equal to one as Hall (2001) does.
Skilled labor consists of university graduates and executives. The price of intangible capital






The construction of this unit cost will be discussed in the calibration section, once the
wage of skilled workers is speciﬁed as a function of the wage of university graduates and
executives. The production of output proceeds according to F(kt−1,lu
t ,ls
t) where F(.) is
assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. The price of output is the numeraire.
The model departs from the baseline q-theory model by deﬁning a composite investment
good which is accumulated into a capital stock. At each period t, the ﬁrm combines intangible
goods xI
t with tangible investment goods xT
t to produce a ﬁnal investment good xt according












The exponent ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate inputs and is
assumed to be less than or equal to 1 while at represents the income share of each input. This
share is allowed to vary over time and is calibrated to capture the evidence on the increasing
spending on intangibles relative to tangibles. This is important because the variation in the
shares will account for the changing structure of the economy in the past 50 years towards
the use of relatively more intangible capital. This CES functional form makes apparent that
this changing structure is a biased technological change.
There is no evidence on the empirical value of ρ. Hall (2001) assumed that tangible and
intangible investment are perfect substitutes so implicitly ρ in his model is equal to 1 and
at = 1 − at. In the calibration section, the baseline model is speciﬁed with ρ = 0 and in the
sensitivity analysis section, various values of ρ are considered.
Tangible investment goods are bought from the market at a price pT which is taken as
given by the ﬁrm. The aggregate investment good accumulates according to
kt = (1 − δ)kt−1 + xt (4)
10where δ is the depreciation rate. The adjustment of the capital stock is subject to output
losses modeled as a cost function assumed to be quadratic and homogeneous of degree one
that is denoted by C(xt,kt−1).
At each period, ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by




















t − C(xt,kt−1). (5)
The ﬁrm’s problem is to choose the optimal level of labor and investment in order to
maximize the net present value of future proﬁts subject to: 1) the technology of production
of intangibles and of the ﬁnal investment good, 2) the capital accumulation equation, 3) the






































vs+T = 0. (8)
The value function vs is the net present value at time s of future payout to securities’ holders:
after the ﬁrm pays inputs their due, the leftover income is paid to owners. Their ownership
materializes through the possession of titles in the form of securities. Hence, vs is also the
value of the ﬁrm at time s.
The model can be shown to be equivalent to a standard q-theory optimization problem
through a two-stage optimization procedure. The only diﬀerence will lie in the interpretation
of the price index of investment goods. The ﬁrst stage is a static problem which consists in
choosing xT and xI to minimize the expenditure on the production of x within each period.
The second stage recasts the above dynamic problem in such a way that it is solved at the
start.















ρ ≤ x. (10)





























where px reﬂects the unit cost of an investment good or the price index of aggregate invest-




























txt − C(xt,kt−1) (14)
s.t.








The solution to this standard problem is detailed in Appendix A. The usual ﬁrst-order
condition on the equality of the lifetime return to increasing capital by one unit with its
marginal cost is given by
λt = p
x
t + Cx(xt,kt−1) (15)
where λt is the shadow price of a unit of installed capital. The right-hand side is the marginal
cost given by the summation of the acquisition price of a unit of capital plus the marginal
adjustment cost of installing this unit of capital. This equation determines the optimal
investment amount to be chosen by the ﬁrm. In order to obtain sharper results with respect
to the investment decision of the ﬁrm, the adjustment cost function is speciﬁed as quadratic


















This is known as the investment equation since it relates the behavior of investment to the
diﬀerence between the value of capital in place λt and its acquisition cost px
t. Investment is
positive when the lifetime return to increasing capital by one unit exceeds its marginal cost
and vice versa. To get around the fact that λt is by deﬁnition unobservable, the ﬁnding of
Hayashi (1982) that
vt = λtkt (18)












Finally, in order to implement the model quantitatively, this relationship is combined





t − α(1 − δ)]kt−1)kt − vtkt−1 = 0 (20)
Hall (2001) shows that a unique solution exists for a general convex cost function with
constant returns to scale. This equilibrium is stable and is therefore not sensitive to initial
conditions in the long-run. kt is the endogenous variable to be solved for and generated at
each point in time. The positive root expresses the law of motion of the capital stock:
kt =
−[px
t − α(1 − δ)]kt−1 +
 
([px




All variables are observable and the pair (vt,px
t) is a suﬃcient statistic to generate the stock
of capital in the economy. This pair of variables is assumed to be taken as given by the ﬁrm.
Once a series for the capital stock is obtained, the contribution of each type of investment
to the overall capital stock can be recovered in the following way: the capital accumulation
equation kt = (1 − δ)kt−1 + xt is substituted forward to obtain:






13Since the technology of production of the ﬁnal investment good is homogeneous of degree

































It is now possible to link the stock of capital to the investment over time in each type of
investment good by substituting this last relationship in the capital equation:


























This equation will be used to disentangle the contribution of each type of investment
into the overall capital stock. Each type of investment is weighted by its relative price which
allows the capital stock to be written in eﬃciency terms. This is a direct consequence of




The parameter values and paths of some exogenous parameters in the law of motion of
capital need to be speciﬁed.
The adjustment-cost parameter α represents the time it takes for the capital stock to
double (halve) when λ doubles (halves). To see this, note that if λ doubles permanently, say
from one to two, it will initially cause the investment-capital ratio to increase by 1
α. For the
investment-capital ratio to double, the increase in 1
α must be repeated for α periods. Hall
(2001) cites the work of Shapiro (1986) to justify the choice of a doubling time parameter of
8 quarters. The depreciation rate of 2.6% per quarter is used by national income accounts
for physical capital. To start the iteration on the law of motion of capital, the value of
the initial capital stock kt−1 needs to be speciﬁed. We will assume that at the pre-initial
quarter, the value of the ﬁrm reﬂects its quantity of installed capital i.e. kt−1 = vt−1. This is
14Table 1: Parameter values
Name Parameter Value Rationale
Adjustment-cost α 8 Shapiro (1986)
Depreciation rate δ 0.026 Hall (2001)
Initial capital stock kt−1 vt−1 Assuming λt−1 = 1
Elasticity of substitution ρ 0 Embodiment assumption
similar to assuming that λt−1 = 1. Since the recursion was shown to be insensitive to initial
conditions, this assumption will not aﬀect the behavior of the system in the long-run.
Given the desire to model intangibles as embodied in tangibles, we allow a certain degree
of complementarity between the two types of investment goods. It will be enough to set ρ
equal to zero as a baseline case. This will transform the CES function into a Cobb-Douglas
function and as a result, the composite investment good will capture the embodiment of
intangibles in tangible investment goods. The shares will then be represented by the expo-
nents on each input which makes the ﬁnal investment good an aggregator of two intermediate
investment goods. Indeed, it will be a share-weighted function that is apparent to an in-
dex of investment. The weights represent the share of each intermediate investment good
in the overall investment expenditure. In fact, it is a Divisia index approach to combining
two investment goods. Following this logic, x will then be viewed as an index of aggregate
investment. In the sensitivity analysis section, ρ will be allowed to take a value bigger and
lower than 0.














Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used and the rationale for the choice of each
value.
4.2 Varying Parameters
The market value of net ﬁnancial claims (ﬁnancial liabilities minus ﬁnancial assets) is used
as the measure of vt since the value of ownership claims are a reﬂection of the installed
capital inside the ﬁrm. Indeed, vt was deﬁned as the present value of payouts to securities’
15holders. Assuming that investors are rational, it follows that the present value of payouts vt
will equal the value of securities on the market. Since for all t, vt = λtkt, then the value of
securities equals the value of the installed capital stock.
Notice that vt includes all ﬁnancial claims towards ﬁrms, net of ﬁnancial assets. These
claims are made of equity, bonds and all other other liabilities (loans and mortgages, short-
term paper, trade payables, life insurance and pensions). The deﬁnition of vt represents a
departure from most of the q-theory literature’s interpretation of vt. Traditionally, vt covers
only equity values or equity plus bonds. This departure is mainly due to the new types of
data that are available for use.
Most of the data to measure vt is taken from the national balance sheet account at market
value from 1950Q1 to 2005Q4. Equity is reported at market value and all the other liabilities
are at book value. These were converted by Hall (2001) into market value. Data analysis
focuses on the non-farm, non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. This sector was chosen because it
best ﬁts the perfectly competitive framework of this paper. The removal of the farming
sector aims to control for the presence of land in the overall capital stock, a capital input
in ﬁxed supply, which therefore earns rents. The choice of the corporate sector ensures that
securities are continually priced to accurately reﬂect new information regarding the value
of the capital stock. This would not be true for the installed capital of unincorporated
businesses. Another reason to focus on this sector is dictated by the fact that the farming
sector, the non-corporate sector and the ﬁnancial sector suﬀer from data quality problems.
The use of the non-farm, non-ﬁnancial corporate sector is not restrictive given that this
sector owns around 90% of the non-residential ﬁxed capital stock in the economy.
A full description of data sources and data manipulations can be found in Appendix B.
The paper
This speciﬁcation highlights the relationship between the labor market for high-skilled
workers and the cost of intangibles. Since national income accounts do not collect information
on the investment of ﬁrms in intangibles, and because the market for intangibles is extremely
thin7, little is known about their aggregate price. The view taken in this paper is that the
7Some R&D spending leads to the creation of a patent which will carry a price if commercialized. However,
the market for patents is extremely thin: very few patents change hands. For example, Serrano (2006)

































































































































































Figure 3: Real Mean Earnings of University Graduates. Source: BLS.
major manufacturers of intangible goods, as listed in Corrado et al. (2005), are university
graduates and executives. Due to the rapid increase in demand of intangibles as documented
by Corrado et al. (2006), this category of workers experienced a widely documented increase
in their wage premium starting in the early 80s. (See Katz and Autor (1999) and Lemieux
(2007) for an up-to-date review of this literature). Figure 3 shows the evolution of the real
wage of university graduates from 1970 to today. The upward trend observed up to 2000
and the subsequent fall is still preserved if this wage is taken as a ratio of non-university
graduates.
Another category of workers which experienced an impressive rise in their wages is ex-
ecutives. Frydman and Saks (2007) report data from 1935 on CEO compensation. Figure
4 reproduces their ﬁndings. There is an upward trend starting in the early 80s. The rise
and fall in the stock market around 2000 seems to have had an important eﬀect on the
compensation trend. This documented evolution in the labor market for high-skilled work-
ers is important in valuing the competitive price of produced intangible goods and thereby
accurately constructing an index for the price of aggregate investment.
Using the wage of executives and college graduates together with the shares of these
inputs allows the construction of the intangible unit cost8. The behavior of this price is
no more than ﬁve patents in a given year) are traded once or more.



































































































































































































Figure 4: Real Mean Compensation of Executives (in thousands). Source: Frydman and
Saks (2007)
depicted in Figure 5 in log scale. The price of intangibles pI is rising at a constant rate from
1950 until mid-80s. Afterwards, its growth rate accelerates driven by the rise in the wage of
CEOs and in their increasing share in the overall wage bill up to 2000. The growth rate of
the intangible price falls afterwards.
It is possible to construct an aggregate price index that combines the price of intangible












is calibrated. Corrado et al. (2006) report the spending of U.S. ﬁrms on an identiﬁed list of
intangible inputs as mentioned before. The National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
recorded 20% of the reported expenditures in intangibles by Corrado et al. (2006). pTxT is
the private ﬁxed investment as recorded by NIPA from which the included recorded intan-
gibles are subtracted. These recorded intangibles consisted of software, mineral exploration,
and architectural and design services. The time series behavior of this ratio captures the
biased technological change which resulted in the use of relatively more xI. Figure 6 shows
the behavior of a overtime.





































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Share of Intangible Expenditure in Overall Investment Expenditure a. Source:
Corrado et al. (2006) and author’s calculations.
19the 1950s. After 2000, ﬁrms’ investment in intangibles began to surpass the investment in
tangible investment goods. For the purpose of this paper, this is important in constructing
an accurate measure of aggregate investment. Indeed, because the share of expenditure
of ﬁrms in intangibles has been increasing overtime, the reported aggregate investment by
national income accounts, which consists mainly of tangible investment, is only a partial
reﬂection of the investment activity of ﬁrms.














to derive the series on the aggregate investment price index px. This is shown in Figure 7
together with the price series of tangibles pT. Both the rise in the price of intangibles and
their increasing share in overall investment results in an aggregate investment deﬂator whose
behavior contrasts markedly with the (physical) investment deﬂator reported by national
income accounts; while the investment deﬂator of national accounts has a downward trend
beginning in the mid-1950s, the investment deﬂator from the model has a downward trend
until the mid-1980s and then rises until 2000 at which point it peaks and then falls9. In other
words, the behavior of the acquisition cost of capital is dramatically diﬀerent when intangibles
are accounted for. In particular, note that the price of intangibles behaves opposite than
that of the price of physical capital. This drives the unique shape of the aggregate price of
investment since it is a shared weighted index.
5 Quantitative Findings and Results
5.1 Behavior of the Stock of Capital
Figure 8 shows how the value of the ﬁrm vt is contrasted to the generated capital stock kt
and to its acquisition cost px
tkt.
The ﬁrst notable feature is that the implied stock of capital smoothly increases until
the peak of 2000 and then falls and ﬂattens out. The second notable feature is the contrast
between the series of the acquisition cost of capital with the one shown in Figure 1 which uses
9The secular fall in the price of physical investment goods is a well documented fact. See in particular































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: The Contributions to the Inferred Capital Stock
the national accounts investment deﬂator. The smoothness depicted from oﬃcial statistics
in Figure 1 is at odds with what Figure 8 depicts. The rise in the acquisition cost of capital
as a result of the larger share of intangibles and their rising cost is at the source of this
discrepancy. Note that allowing for irreversible investment doesn’t aﬀect the behavior of the
capital stock series. Appendix D extends the model to allow for irreversible investment and
discusses why this addition is innocuous.
5.2 Contribution of Intangibles and Tangibles to Capital Stock
Figure 9 shows the decomposition of the contribution of the series of intangibles and tangible
capital. Notice that the contribution of intangible investment goods has been substantial.
The rise in the overall capital stock from the mid-80s until the late 90s was driven mainly
by an increase in intangible investment. After 2000, the contribution of intangibles falls
consistently to reach a level similar to the one in 1990. These movements in the contribution
of intangibles underscore the importance of this type of capital as a source of variation in
the value for the ﬁrm and as a key component of any investment theory. The fall in the
22contribution of intangibles after mid-70s draws a parallel with the explanation of Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1999) on the reasons for the fall in the value of securities in the early 70s.
These authors argue that it is the arrival of the information technology at a time where
the stock market incumbents of the day were not ready to implement it which depressed
stock prices. The arrival of this general purpose technology eﬀectively destroyed the value
of existing capital. This suggests that intangible capital experienced obsolescence and its
value started to fall accordingly more rapidly than for the price of tangibles as suggested by
Figure 7.
5.3 Implications for Tobin’s q Series













The result from the extended q-theory shows that the behavior of Tobin’s q is almost
always positive. Figure 10 depicts the fact that the market value of the capital stock predom-
inantly remains above and close to its acquisition cost; this reﬂects a Tobin’s q that ﬂuctuates
closely around its equilibrium value, a desirable feature which is not observed in empirical
measures of Tobin’s q when capital is exclusively made of physical investment goods. In
particular, Tobin’s q does not fall below one for extended periods. Hall (2001) delivers a
Tobin’s q which is more volatile. His result stems from an absence of a rise and then a fall
in the price of intangibles which would push up px
t before 2000 and lower it afterwards. This
would oﬀset the rise and then fall in the value of the ﬁrm and keep Tobin’s q around its
equilibrium value. The next section explores more thoroughly the diﬀerences in the ﬁndings
with Hall (2001).
Note that other authors such as Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) deliver a theoretical Tobin’s
q that is positive and constant due to how they specify the production of intangibles in their













































































































































































































Figure 10: Behavior of Tobin’s q
goods and technological revolutions; it is not comparable to the setup of the model in this
paper.
6 Comparison of Findings with Existing Literature
In this section, I will compare the model developed in this paper with the models used both
by Hall (2001) and by McGrattan and Prescott (2007a). The comparison will abstract from
the presence of adjustment costs, taxes and diﬀerence in depreciation rates and will focus
on the expression of the ﬁrm’s value and the implications of assumptions made about the
measurement of the size of the capital stock. The results of each paper will also be contrasted
with the ﬁndings described above.
Recall that the forward substitution in the capital accumulation equation led to the
general expression given by equation 24, reproduced here for convenience:















This expression will be shown to diﬀer in important ways across approaches.
6.1 Reframing Hall (2001)
As mentioned in the introduction, the model developed in this paper diﬀers from Hall (2001)
by relaxing the assumption that pI = pT and by allowing xT and xI to have some degree of
substitutability. In the case of Hall (2001), the value of the ﬁrm is given by
Vt = p
T







where pT is the (physical) investment price deﬂator from national accounts. Indeed, Hall
assumes that there is one price of investment goods i.e., pT = pI and implicitly assumes















6.2 Reframing McGrattan and Prescott (2007a)
In McGrattan and Prescott (2007a), the model they use implies an expression for the value

















t is the price of tangible investment goods (considered to be equal to the numeraire,
assumed to be the consumption good) and pI
t is the price of intangible capital goods. The
price of intangibles is guessed as part of the solution to their general equilibrium model.
Unfortunately, the authors do not report the series for pI
t. The model of McGrattan and
Prescott features two capital accumulation equations similar to Equation 32, as done by Hall
as well.
256.3 Models’ Comparison














Note that the two investment goods in this paper are not accumulated because they are
intermediate goods. However, in Hall (2001) and in McGrattan and Prescott (2007a), the
two investment goods are ﬁnal so they are separately accumulated over time. Moreover,
the non-embodiment in Hall and in McGrattan and Prescott of investment goods results in
two prices, one for each accumulated investment good while in this paper, there is only one
price for the accumulated investment good. This one aggregate price deﬂator is attached
to a single overall stock of capital, as it is commonly modeled when using an aggregate
production function.
The comparison of the expressions for capital stock in each model will also reveal an-
other consequence of the embodiment hypothesis. To see this, note that the embodiment





















































Both parts of the right-hand-side of this last expression are similar to the corresponding







Such a capital stock exists in Hall (2001) by construction but not in McGrattan and
Prescott (2007a) because this is not the capital stock which enters into the production of





















































































































































































































Figure 11: Comparison of ﬁndings with Hall (2001)
6.4 Comparison of Findings
Hall’s implied capital stock series has a very pronounced bell-shape around 2000 as shown
in Figure 11. Given that the acquisition cost of capital goods is identiﬁed to the tangible
deﬂator which was falling throughout, his model’s implication of a rise and then fall in the
value of securities is for the ﬁrm to invest massively and then disinvest. Everything else the
same, the secular fall in the price of new investment goods leads to more investment. This is
not the case in the extended model presented here: the acquisition cost of capital becomes
heavily skewed towards intangibles whose price begins to rise starting in the 80s. It then falls
after 2000 causing the acquisition cost of capital to have a bell shape around 2000 (recall
Figure 7). The implication is that the ﬁrm in this paper has less incentive to accumulate
capital before 2000 and to disinvest after 2000 once the price of aggregate investment falls.
This explains why the extended model features a much less pronounced bell-shape around
2000.
The assumption of the equality between the prices of intangibles and tangibles leads to
Hall’s ﬁnding that the quantity of intangible capital is negative from the mid-70s until the
27mid-80s. The model in this paper does not feature such an anomaly. To see why, observe that
the constructed price series of aggregate investment in Figure 7 falls faster than the tangible
price series up until the mid-80s. Firm’s incentive to invest in the extended model is therefore
bigger than in Hall’s model. As a result, the accumulation of capital is higher during this
period than in Hall, which makes the implied contribution of intangible investment higher.
Comparing the extended model’s results with the ﬁndings of McGrattan and Prescott
(2007a) is not as straightforward because they use a general equilibrium framework and
because they emphasize diﬀerent series. In particular, the price of intangibles is not reported
in their paper. In their technical appendix (McGrattan and Prescott, 2007b) the authors
only mention that they guessed this price series. Furthermore, McGrattan and Prescott
do not report a series for intangible investment alone, which makes it hard to compare the
size of intangible investment directly. However, the authors report two series that include,
in one way or another, intangible investment: 1) intangible investment as a share of total
GDP (their Figure 6) and 2) a graph containing the series of overall investment and tangible
investment (their Figure 12).
It is not possible to use the ﬁrst series to make quantitative comparisons regarding the
amount of intangible investment because McGrattan and Prescott make many corrections
to GDP. However, this series can be used to compare the qualitative ﬁndings. In particular,
McGrattan and Prescott ﬁnd that intangibles are falling in the early 90s while in this paper
intangible investment was shown to rise during that period. The behavior of intangible
investment around 2000 is similar.
The second series is used to approximate the diﬀerence between the overall investment
and the tangible investment, which is the intangible investment found in McGrattan and
Prescott. Following this method of backing out intangible investment, it seems that intan-
gible investment is quite small between 1990 and 1994. It then rises until 1999; This rise is
about 20%. Afterwards, intangible investment falls to a very low level. The drop is about
40% between 2000 and 2003. On the other hand, the extended q-theory model results in a
rise of intangible investment by 150% between 1990 and 1992. Then it falls by 150% be-
tween 1992 and 1994. After 1994, intangible investment increases until 1999 by 300% and
falls afterwards by 350%. The bottom line of these comparisons is that the extended model
28reports more intangible investment growth before 2000 and more decline after 2000 than
that in McGrattan and Prescott (2007a).
To sum up, the above discussion implies that the reported results in this paper lie some-
how in between the ﬁndings of Hall and of McGrattan and Prescott.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, two experiments are conducted to assess the robustness of the results. The
ﬁrst involves specifying a diﬀerent value for the elasticity of substitution than was assumed
in the baseline model (ρ = 0). In order to explore the consequence of assuming less com-
plementarity, i.e. when ρ ∈ (0;1], and more complementarity, i.e. when ρ ∈ (−∞;0),
between the two investment goods compared to the baseline case, two values of ρ are used.
These values are arbitrarily chosen. To explore the consequence of less complementarity, or
equivalently, more substitution, ρ is set equal to 0.5. Then, to explore the consequence of
more complementarity, or equivalently, less substitution, ρ is set equal to −0.5. The impact
of changing the value of ρ on the model will appear through the value of px, as shown in
Equation 11, and ultimately on the generated stock of capital and the contribution of each
type of investment good according to Equation 24.
The second experiment involves using diﬀerent wage series data when calculating the
price index of intangibles. Here again, I explore the consequence of ﬁrst using only the real
wage of university graduates and second, diﬀerent portions of the components of executive
compensation, on the price of the composite investment good. The impact of the experiments
on the contribution of intangibles relative to the overall capital stock is summarized in Table
2.
7.1 Allowing for Diﬀerent Elasticity of Substitution Values
Figure 12 depicts the consequence of allowing for more and less complementarity between
the two investment goods on the price of the composite investment good. By setting ρ = 0.5,
the two investment goods are made less complementary to each other. This results in an
investment price index which has an overall behavior that is similar to the price index from













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 13: Impact of Diﬀerent Wage Series on Price of Composite Investment Good
allowing ρ = −0.5 leads px to behave almost opposite to its value with ρ = 0.5. By looking
at Equation 11, it becomes obvious why this occurs: with more substitutability allowed, the
income share of each investment good relative to its own price becomes the relevant variable.
The opposite occurs when we allow for more complementarity. In any case, it is interesting
to note that the behavior of the generated capital and the contribution of each input are
not signiﬁcantly aﬀected in either scenario. Table 2 shows the discrepancies in the relative
contribution of intangibles for each value of ρ.
7.2 Allowing for Diﬀerent Wage Series
In this exercise, I consider the impact of using ﬁrst only the real wage of university graduates
and second, only one component of the executive compensation at a time on the price of the
composite investment good. Figure 13 reproduces the ﬁndings of the baseline model shown
in Figure 7 and the results of each experiment10.
10Note that because the wage data series are being changed, the implied initial values had to be adjusted
each time in accordance with the procedure described in Appendix C, Section 4.3 and mentioned in Footnote
27.
31The ﬁrst experiment involved using only the wage of skilled labor. Because labor pro-
ductivity, θ, grows faster than the wage of skilled workers, the price of intangibles falls
monotonically over time. However, given that this fall is not as steep as the fall in the
price of tangibles before the 80s and after the mid-90s, I ﬁnd that the price of the com-
posite investment good is almost always higher than the price of tangibles. Note that the
rise in the composite investment good price after the mid-90s relative to the reported tan-
gible price series is due to the increasing share of intangibles in overall investment. This
causes the relatively benign fall in the price of intangibles to reduce the fall in the price
index of the composite investment good. This ﬁnding suggests that oﬃcial statistics still
under-estimated the price of capital goods by the late 90s even though we don’t observe the
same pattern as in the baseline case. As for the impact on the contribution of intangibles
and tangibles to the overall capital stock, the qualitative ﬁndings remain the same as the
baseline speciﬁcation (see Table 2). However, quantitatively, the contributions track the
ones found in Hall, admittedly with a diﬀerent interpretation, as explained in the previous
section. This happens because the composite price index series behaves almost similarly to
the price of tangibles. That the quantitative ﬁndings are similar to Hall is not surprising:
the complementarity assumption works through the price index. If the constructed price
index resembles the behavior of the price of tangibles, then the behavior of the generated
capital and the contribution of each input is almost the same.
The second experiment involves using the diﬀerent components of the executive wage
compensation which are shown in Figure 4. Figure 13 shows that as I eliminate each compo-
nent of executive compensation at a time, the overall behavior of the composite investment
index is the same but the rise up to 2000 and the subsequent fall, are less pronounced. Note
also that as I downplay the compensation of executives, and at the same time their share in
wage compensation relative to skilled workers, the composite investment index price series
gets closer to the price of tangibles. As a result, the implied stock of capital is closer to the
one reported by Hall.
To summarize, the non-inclusion of executive compensation or the inclusion of diﬀerent
components of executive compensation alters the behavior of the composite investment price
index but does not take away from the main message of the text: namely, that the reported
32index of the price of capital goods has a downward bias in the 90s due to the rise in the
contribution of intangibles in overall investment. This exercise shows also that the derived
capital series and the contribution of intangibles and tangibles to the overall capital stock is
not qualitatively aﬀected.
8 Conclusion
This paper extended the q-theory of investment to account for intangible investment and
used the model to measure the contribution of embodied intangible goods to the overall
capital stock in the U.S. The paper also explored the quantitative implications of the model
on the behavior of the capital stock and Tobin’s q.
The price trend of aggregate investment was shown to contrast markedly with the aggre-
gate investment deﬂator series reported by national accounts because this deﬂator series does
not account for the price eﬀect of intangibles. In addition, the extended model successfully
generated a smoothly-behaving series of capital stock with a market value that predomi-
nantly remains above its book value; this reﬂects a Tobin’s q that is mostly above one, a
feature which is not observed in empirical measures of Tobin’s q when capital is exclusively
made of tangible investment. Furthermore, the model shows that the rise in the overall cap-
ital stock from the mid-80s until the late 90s was driven mainly by an increase in intangible
investment. However, the contribution of intangibles fell consistently after 2000. These re-
sults underscore the importance of accounting for the movements in the price of intangibles
rather than focusing only on their rising share in overall investment. These ﬁndings conﬁrm
the changing nature of the stock of capital in the economy and the quantitative importance
of intangibles, underscoring the importance of intangibles as a source of value for the ﬁrm
and as a key component of any investment theory.
Two main avenues are proposed for future work. First, the price of aggregate investment
reﬂected two secular stylized facts: 1) the larger role for intangibles in production and 2)
the rise in their cost of production as illustrated by the growth in compensation of skilled
labor and executives. The link between the labor market for high-skilled workers and cap-
ital markets was shown to be key in obtaining these results. This feature might provide a
better understanding of the mixed performance of the econometric estimation of the invest-
33ment equation. These regressions tend to produce low R2’s and serially correlated residuals.
Moreover, additional regressors, such as output and cash ﬂow, also appear to be important
factors in the investment decision, as they typically have statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
(Chirinko, 1993). These problems may be due to the omission of intangibles when valuing
the true cost of new investment goods. In future work, I plan to use the data series on the
acquisition cost of capital corrected for the inclusion of intangibles, as constructed above, to
investigate whether the econometric estimation of the investment equation did indeed suﬀer
from speciﬁcation problems.
A second future extension is to explore the insight that intangibles are produced mainly
by skilled workers, in order to address the puzzle found in Hall (2003). In that paper,
Hall ﬁnds that the payment to intangibles is almost nil. He reaches this conclusion after
comparing the income stream accrued from physical capital as predicted by the baseline
user-cost of capital theory, with the income stream observed from earnings of ﬁrms. Hall
ﬁnds that the present value of the future ﬂow of income generated by intangibles is close to
zero, suggesting that their size is unimportant. I suspect that the treatment of intangibles
as expenditures (as opposed to capital goods) caused reported earnings to be undervalued.
This omission could deliver the ﬁnding that once physical capital is paid for its services,
there is nothing left to reward intangible capital. I plan to redo Hall’s (2003) exercise using
earnings that are corrected for this mismeasurement and investigate whether Hall’s ﬁndings
hold for this correction.
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A Derivation of First-Order Conditions
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: kt = (1 − δ)kt−1 + xt
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier or the shadow price of an additional unit of capital.






0. The ﬁrst equation illustrates the equality of the lifetime return to increasing capital by
one unit with its marginal cost given by the price of a unit of capital plus the marginal
adjustment cost of installing this unit of capital. This equation determines the optimal in-
vestment amount to be chosen by the ﬁrm. The second and third equation state the usual
38equilibrium condition for the labor market whereby the real wage is equal to the marginal
product of labor. The next equation shows the dynamic equilibrium equation of λ with its
continuation value. The last equation recasts the investment technology constraint.
B Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
The deﬂator used is the quarterly CPI and the base year adopted is 1996. This series is
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics which reports the CPI on a monthly basis for
all urban consumers from 1913 until today (Series ID: CUUR0000SA0). I take the average
of three consecutive months to obtain the quarterly equivalent.
The data on output per worker are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics under
the heading “major sector productivity and costs index”. Because of data availability, I use
the output per person of the business sector from 1950 until 1957 (Series ID: PRS84006163)
and then the output per person of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector from 1957 until 1975
(Series ID: PRS88003163).
The data on wages of workers by educational attainment is collected annually by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Current Population Survey and reported every March for
the whole economy. I use table A-3 entitled “Mean Earnings of Workers 18 Years and Over,
by Educational Attainment, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex: 1975 to 2005” to obtain data
on mean annual earnings and number of workers by educational attainment. There are 5
educational levels: not a high school graduate, high school graduate, some college/associate
degree, bachelor’s degree and advanced degree. Earnings refer to the total income people
receive for work performed as an employee during the income year. This includes wages,
salary, armed forces pay, commissions, tips, piece-rate payments, and cash bonuses earned,
before deductions are made for items such as taxes, bonds, pensions, and union dues. The
wage of university workers is calculated as follows. I multiply the mean annual earnings of
workers with a bachelor’s degree and advanced degree by their respective number of workers
and divide the result by the total number of workers with a bachelor’s and advanced degree.
I extend the data from 1975 until 1950 using the growth of output per worker. The implicit
assumption is that the mean earnings of university graduates grew at the same rate as
productivity per worker from 1950 to 1975. This assumption has a strong empirical support
39during this period (see Lemieux (2007)).
The wage bill of skilled labor from 1975 to 2005 is obtained by multiplying the mean
earnings of university graduates by the number of university graduates. I extend the data
back to 1950 using the economy wide compensation of employees. This series is provided by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis in their Table 1.10. entitled “gross domestic income by
type of income”, line 2. This extension relies on the same assumption as the one outlined in
the previous paragraph.
The data on executive compensation and its composition are taken from Frydman and
Saks (2007). This series is a major improvement on previous studies which collected data
on executive compensation for short samples, with diﬀerent sample designs and employed
diﬀerent methodologies to value compensation and its components (see for example Antle
and Smith (1985), Hall and Liebman (1998) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005).) The work
of Frydman and Saks (2007) is the ﬁrst comprehensive panel dataset on executive compensa-
tion that spans the period 1936 to 2003. The sample follows the compensation of individual
oﬃcers in the largest 50 publicly traded corporations ranked according to the value of sales
in 1940, 1960 and 1990. This amounted to a total of 102 ﬁrms. Frydman and Saks discuss
the representativeness of their sample in Appendix Section 3, and conclude that it is rep-
resentative of the largest 300 publicly-traded corporations. They limit their analysis to the
top three oﬃcers in order to maintain a consistent group of individuals over time, but the
results are robust to including the 4th and 5th highest-paid executives.
The data on the number of chief executives is taken from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) Survey produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The occupational title
is “chief executive” with the occupational code 11-1011. This data is available from 1998
to 2005. From 1983 until 1997, the OES survey used a somewhat diﬀerent classiﬁcation
system. The closest occupational deﬁnition for our purpose is the “management, business,
and ﬁnancial operations occupations” (Series ID: LNU02032202). I use the growth rate of
this occupation to extend the data on the number of chief executives backward to 1983.
Finally, I use the growth rate of the employment in the private sector to extend this data
backward to 1950. This data are produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis under Table
6.5 A-D with the heading “full-time equivalent employees by industry”.
40The wage bill of executives is calculated by multiplying the average CEO compensation
reported by Frydman and Saks (2007) by the number of chief executives described in the
previous paragraph.
The price of tangible investment goods is the national income and product accounts
implicit deﬂator for ﬁxed non-residential investment. This series is published by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis under Table 7.1 “quantity and price indexes for GDP quarterly”, line
32.
The data on the real capital stock and the value of securities are taken from Hall (2001)
and are extended to 2005. The data on intangible expenditures are taken from Corrado et
al. (2006).
C Calibration of Starting Values
The initial value of pI is calibrated such that the ﬁrm’s investment condition given by equa-





where the variables with a bar denote their sample average. Once the value pI
0 is found, θ0
is deduced and made to grow at the rate of change of output per worker. Also, pI
0 is used to
calculate the starting value of px.
The empirical starting value of the share of executives in overall wage bill is φ0 = 0.47.
Corrado et al. (2006) calibrate this value to be φ0 = 0.21 on the basis that executives spend
20% of their time in activities that involve organizational change and design. I chose this
starting value to be an average of the two values φ0 = 0.33. The results are not sensitive to
departures from this initial value inside the set of values made of these two boundary values.
Finally, the starting value of a is taken from the constructed series on the share of tangible
expenditures in overall investment expenditures. It is found that a0 = 0.74.
41D Allowing for Irreversibility in Investment
The generated stock of capital is not sensitive to the existence of irreversibility in investment.


















kt−1 if xt < 0
where the adjustment-cost parameter α+ (α−) has the same interpretation as in the model:
it represents the time it takes for the capital stock to double (halve) when λ doubles
(halves). By allowing the downward adjustment-cost parameter to be higher than the upward
adjustment-cost parameter, this asymmetry in the investment decision will reﬂect irreversibil-
ity of investment. Setting α+ = 8 as in the main text and allowing α− to be arbitrarily set
at up to ten times higher than the upward adjustment-cost parameter, the generated capital
stock will not be aﬀected. The result behind this ﬁnding comes from the fact that gross
investment is almost always above depreciation expenditures in the data. In other words,
net investment is almost always positive so there is little evidence on irreversibility at the
aggregate level. In addition, when net investment is negative, its magnitude is quite small.
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